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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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October 31, 1962
(27)

MEMORANDUM

TO: IO - Mr. Wallner
ACDA - Mr. Fisher
ARA - Mr. Martin
ISA/DOD - Mr. Barber
L - Mr. Chayes

FROM: G/FM - Raymond L. Garthoff *Red*

SUBJECT: Draft Instruction on Long Term Verification Arrangements Concerning Cuba

Attached is the draft initial section of instructions intended to provide guidance on phase III assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. IO has prepared the more detailed section on consensual negotiations ratified by the UN, which is also attached. ARA and L should be drafting the parallel discussion on the use of an CAS resolution to authorize necessary verification. ACDA has been asked to provide the discussion on use of a demilitarized zone in Latin America for such assurances and inspection arrangements. These draft sections (in several copies) should be in my hands as soon as possible in order to be incorporated in the over-all draft instruction which Mr. Johnson wishes to have for the 10:00 a.m. meeting on November 1.

ISA/DOD and L are preparing a related background paper on the technical requirements for surveillance and inspection, and it is hoped that this paper also can be available by that time.

cc: G/FM - Mr. Kitchen
INR - Mr. Hilsman

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DRAFT INSTRUCTION ON LONG TERM VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS
CONCERNING CUBA

1. OBJECTIVE.

The purpose of this instruction is to provide guidance for negotiation of the arrangements governing long term assurances against the introduction of offensive nuclear weapons into Latin America, and especially against the reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba so long as that country is ruled by a Marxist-Leninist regime. Earlier instructions have been provided to cover arrangements for Phase I and Phase II (Department 1147 dtd October 31 to USUN). Phase III would begin when the Security Council has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have in fact been removed from Cuba.

2. METHODS OF GAINING ASSURANCE.

The chief means of insuring ourselves that the Soviets do not introduce nuclear weapons systems into Cuba or elsewhere in Latin America is unilateral intelligence. However, such intelligence should be considered and used as a supplement to internationally recognized procedures for verification of the non-introduction of offensive weapons. The three principal methods of overt verification would be: (a) aerial reconnaissance; (b) control over incoming shipping; and (c) ground inspection. Of the three, aerial reconnaissance is probably the most significant and the least

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-2-

obvious an intrusion. Control over shipping, by placement of inspectors at all ports and airfields, would also be generally effective. Ground inspection would not be practicable as a basic inspection mechanism, but it could be valuable ~~and even necessary~~ for checking up in instances when aerial reconnaissance or unilateral intelligence had inconclusive evidence of a possible violation; in other words, it could be a valuable supplementary means for checking on suspicious events.

The selection or combination of these methods would depend heavily upon the political arrangements under which the inspection was undertaken. Moreover, the first purpose of such arrangements would be to deter potential violation, as well as to detect such violation if it were not deterred.

3. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION.

We have examined four alternative arrangements under which long term assurances could be established. These arrangements are not all mutually exclusive, and our conclusion is that their preferable solution is initial agreement and implementation of Solution 2, followed by, and perhaps superseded by, Solution 4.

(1) Consensual Agreement Ratified by the UN. One course of action would be bilateral or trilateral negotiation reaching an [redacted]

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- 3 -

agreement between the US (also representing the OAS interests), the USSR, and Cuba (either directly or indirectly through the USSR). Such an arrangement might include Cuban acquiescence in aerial surveillance, port inspection, and ground inspection of suspicious events. It would be ratified by the Security Council, for the period of time until the Security Council (i.e., the US) decided it was no longer necessary. A more detailed discussion of this solution is found in Annex A.

(2) An OAS Resolution. It would be possible, probably on very short notice, to ~~such through~~ obtain an OAS resolution authorizing continuing overflights pending a permanent verification arrangement in conjunction with a denuclearized zone. It would ~~even~~ be possible to include in such a resolution a provision calling for on-site ~~but this would not be practically effective unless Cuba assents~~ ground inspection of suspicious events. The US would probably, but not necessarily, conduct future overflights. There would be no time limit on action undertaken in pursuance of this resolution, and if a denuclearized zone were not agreed upon or used for this purpose the OAS surveillance operation would remain in effect. Further discussion of this solution is contained in Annex B, and a draft resolution appears as an addendum to that Annex.

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-4-

(3) Unilateral US Surveillance. A third, and fallback, solution would be simply unilateral US overflight on the basis of the OAS Resolution of October 23. In addition to political disadvantages, this solution would not provide any continuing grounds for controls over shipping or ground inspection. It is, therefore, recognized to be only a fallback position.

(4) A Latin-American Denuclearized Zone. The fourth possible solution would probably be a follow-on to the first or second, since it would probably take some time to establish such a zone and the temporary UN inspection would end at the end of Phase II. Inspection arrangements under a denuclearized zone would depend a great deal on whether such a zone had been established with Cuban participation and agreement, ~~or was imposed on Cuba by an OAS action~~. Considerations affecting the use of a denuclearized zone for Phase III assurances appear in Annex C to this paper.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ANNEX A: SOLUTION 1

The exchange of letters between the President and Khrushchev constitute in review a firm undertaking for the establishment of safeguards against the re-introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. (In his letter of October 27 the President said "you would ...undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.")

One way to obtain safeguards against re-introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba would be to attempt to reach agreement of the three parties concerned, i.e., US, USSR and Cuba, for the establishment of a continuing inspection of Cuba. An inspection system could then be set up under the UN to provide for aerial surveillance of Cuba and for ground inspection of suspicious events reported to the SIG by his inspectors or by a member of the Security Council. If tripartite agreement were possible on this basis, authorization for the establishment of such an inspection system could be incorporated into the same SC resolution which accepts the report of the SIG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba at the end of Phase II.

[Quite apart from the almost unsurmountable difficulties in extracting such an agreement from the Russians (and even greater ones from the Cubans) we see real disadvantages in our pursuing this track. In the first place, it would institutionalize for an indefinite period the intrusion of the Soviet Union into the

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- 2 -

Western Hemisphere where we now have the opportunity of closing out this intrusion for all time. Such an agreement would also afford the Soviets, through the Security Council mechanism, a wide variety of occasions to raise their voice in Caribbean matters in the future.

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ANNEX B: AMERICAN DECLARATION

BRIEF RESOLUTION FOR POSSIBLE ADOPTION BY THE COUNCIL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ACTING CO-
VISIONALLY AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION UNDER THE RIO TREATY

WHEREAS:

The CCUS/OC in its Resolution of October 23, 1962, recognizing that
"incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the Government of Cuba,
despite repeated warnings, has secretly endangered the peace of the
Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and
middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads";

Called "for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of
all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability";

WHEREAS:

The establishment of nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems in
the territory of an American Republic which did not possess such capability
at the date on which it adhered to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance creates a situation which would endanger the peace and security
of the continent and is thus inconsistent with the purposes and principles
set forth in the Charter of the OAS;

THE COAS/CC DECIDES

1. That no American Republic referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall establish or permit the establishment within its territory of
nuclear weapons, missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads or
nuclear delivery systems;

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2. That upon the allegation by any American Republic that a Member State is failing to comply with or is preparing to violate Paragraph 1 of this Resolution, that State shall permit without delay duly qualified observers appointed by the appropriate body of the OAS to enter its territory for the purpose of verifying the truth or falsity of the allegations.

ABA:EM:Martin:WAllen:pep
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